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State, Market and Society Relations: 
The Roaring Last Fifty Years
Luka Biong Deng Kuol
Abstract During the last 50 years, the world has experienced increased 
growth, inequality and a change in state–market–civil society relations 
similar to the ‘Roaring Twenties’ in the 1920s. This growing inequality can 
be attributed to the hegemony of neoliberalism that has been confronted 
by rising civil society as a ‘global conscience’ for fairer world governance. 
The high economic growth achieved in the emerging economies shows 
the centrality of the state to achieving more shared growth in developing 
countries. A new hybrid state–market–society alliance holds the potential 
for fairer global governance, checking greed and achieving equitable 
growth in the future.
Keywords: state, market, society, neoliberalism, left-wing, right-wing.
1 Introduction
Since 1966 when the Institute of  Development Studies (IDS) 
was founded, development outcomes have been encouraging but 
alarming as well. The world gross domestic product (GDP) that was 
US$2.125 trillion in 1966 increased to US$73.434 trillion in 2015, while 
the GDP of  sub-Saharan Africa that was US$0.027 trillion in 1960 
increased to US$1.573 trillion in 2015 but its share of  the world GDP 
remained almost the same (World Bank 2016). Despite such impressive 
economic growth, the majority of  developing countries experienced 
slow growth with only a few of  them witnessing unprecedented robust 
growth (Edigheji 2007).
Alarmingly, the gap between rich and poor has been widening, 
particularly in advanced economies, and with a mixed picture in 
emerging economies and developing countries (Dabla-Norris et al. 
2015). Interestingly, the level of  poverty has increased in the advanced 
economies since the 1990s, while it has paradoxically declined in 
emerging economies and developing countries (OECD 2011a). 
Inequality is more prevalent in wealth distribution as 1 per cent of  the 
world’s population is estimated to own almost half  of  the world’s wealth 
– equivalent to 65 times the total wealth owned by the bottom half  of  
the world’s population (Fuentes-Nieva and Galasso 2014).
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While this rapid economic growth can be explained by exceptional 
technological and scientific innovation and improved human capital 
development, there is no consensus on the brute causes of  rising 
inequality and diverse development outcomes. Some argue that the 
low economic growth in some developing economies reflects increased 
reliance on markets (Edigheji 2007), while others see the unbalanced 
relationship between state, market and society as the main reason for 
this rising inequality (Keping 2014).
This article offers some reflections on the implications for development 
policies and outcomes of  the relations between state–market–society 
over the last 50 years, and how such relations may evolve in the future. 
In Section 2, the hegemony of  neoliberal economic policies during the 
last 50 years is discussed and compared with the period of  the 1920s 
known as the ‘Roaring Twenties’. The rise of  global civil society to 
confront the outcomes of  neoliberal economic policies is discussed in 
Section 3. The centrality of  the state in equitable development in the 
emerging economies is discussed in Section 4. The article concludes 
by reflecting on the future trend of  new hybrids and alliances between 
state, market and society in driving the future global development 
agenda for fairer global governance.
2 Developed economies: rising inequality and the hegemony of 
neoliberalism
The pattern of  economic performance and the rising inequality 
observed during the last 50 years resemble a similar pattern that can be 
observed during the Roaring Twenties in 1920s USA (Stone et al. 2015). 
While the decade of  the 1920s started briefly with economic recession, 
the economy started booming with total national wealth doubling 
Figure 1 Rising inequality during the Roaring Twenties and the last 50 years
Source Adapted from Stone et al. (2015).
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between 1920 and 1929. The share of  the richest households of  total 
income reached its highest level of  almost 25 per cent before the end of  
the decade (Figure 1).
Similar to the Roaring Twenties in the USA, income and wealth 
concentration at the top as well as unshared prosperity has become 
predominant in recent decades. Specifically, the concentration of  income 
at the very top of  the distribution rose to the levels observed in the 1920s 
(Stone et al. 2015). The recent work of  Oxfam (2016) shows that wealth 
inequality is a global crisis that is reaching new extremes. Specifically, 
while the wealth of  the richest 62 people has been increasing since 2002, 
the wealth of  the bottom 50 per cent has been increasing since 2000 and 
reached its peak in 2010 when it started declining until it became equal 
to that of  the richest 62 people in 2015 (see Figure 2).
The last 50 years can be termed ‘roaring’ not only because of  this 
growing unshared prosperity but also because of  digital prosperity and 
the information technology revolution that have been driving economic 
growth and innovation (Atkinson and McKay 2007). Furthermore, 
the world has witnessed a surge of  international migration and 
the emergence of  a widespread global concern about immigration 
(IPSOS 2016) similar to the 1920s in the USA when there was extreme 
anxiety about immigration, resulting in the passing of  an extremely 
restrictive immigration law in 1924.
The real question is which politics have been shaping the observed 
income inequality of  the last 50 years? This question can be partially 
answered by looking at the political parties that have been governing 
Source Oxfam (2016).
Figure 2 The wealth of the richest 62 people and wealth of the bottom 50 per cent, 
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during the last 50 years, particularly in the USA and UK (see Table 1). 
In comparison to the 1920s that was monopolised by conservative 
politics such a monopoly has shrunk but the politics of  economic 
neoliberalism has grown. Neoliberal economic policies have largely 
dominated the management of  economies during the last 50 years 
(Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer 2006), particularly in developed 
economies. Meanwhile, neoliberal economic policies in the form of  the 
‘Washington Consensus’ have been directly or indirectly implemented 
in emerging economies and developing countries through multilateral 
organisations (Prasad 2006).
As the main thrust of  neoliberalism is that through markets the private 
sector is the most efficient and effective way to manage the economy 
(Noam 1999), rising inequality is attributed to the market failure 
caused by imperfect property rights and information (Stiglitz 2002). 
This criticism of  neoliberalism became more pronounced during the 
economic crisis in 2007–09 and the financial crises that resulted in states 
having to rescue banks in the USA and Europe.
The bank bailout raised a fundamental question about how such greed 
went undetected (Gwyn 2009) while also renewing debate about the 
future of  capitalism and liberal democracy. Some argue that increasing 
inequality, declining productivity growth and fading trust in governing 
elites may make democracy increasingly intolerant and capitalism 
illegitimate, and that both may be headed for a divorce (Wolf  2016; 
Carter 2016). Specifically, Wolf  (2016) argues that the democratic 
political system that promotes the interests of  the few and not the many 
may founder.
Despite the increased attack on neoliberal policies, right-wing parties 
are even consolidating their hegemony through the politics of  
immigration. With the rise in international migration and refugees to 
Table 1 Who was governing during the last 50 years and the 1920s?
The governing political 
parties
Number of years  
1966–2015
Number of years  
in the 1920s
US Presidents*
Republican 28 (56%) 9 (90%)
Democratic 22 (44%) 1 (10%)
UK Prime Ministers**
Labour 22 (44%) 1 (10%)
Conservative 28 (56%) 7 (70%)
Liberal 0 2 (20%)
Source *Johnson (2016) and **AustralianPolitics.com (2016).
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Europe and the USA, certain right-wing parties and politicians are 
using this effectively to consolidate their popularity by championing 
anti-immigration agendas and projecting immigration as a threat to the 
future of  Europe and the USA (Yilmaz 2012).
3 Confronting neoliberalism: the emergence of a global conscience
This hegemony of  neoliberalism has been resisted and confronted 
in multiple ways during the last 50 years, not only by modern left-
wing liberalism but also by the rising civil society movement, itself  
informed by rigorous academic thinking and research. Thus the rise of  
neoliberalism in the 1970s came under attack not only from the political 
left but also from myriad activists and academics (Plehwe et al. 2006). 
Since the 1980s, the work of  Robert Chambers has helped inspire a 
shift in focus to people-centred participatory development (Chambers 
1983), while also helping to revolutionise research work through 
participatory methods that recognise people as the central custodians 
of  knowledge of  their life and conditions (Chambers 1994). From a 
contrasting standpoint, the work of  economists such as Joseph Stiglitz 
(2011, 2012) has also contributed to awakening civil society to the global 
threat of  rising inequality.
Despite the attempt by neoliberalism to co-opt civil society as part of  
its agenda of  building the ‘market state’, the micro-traditional role of  
civil society has evolved into a role of  nurturing a ‘global conscience’ 
through global advocacy work (Evans and Shields 2000). The number 
of  international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has increased 
astronomically from only 6,000 in 1990 to more than 68,000 in 2015 
(UIA 2015). The rise of  civil society to confront the outcomes of  
economic neoliberal policies is vividly manifested in its advocacy to 
fight corruption, debt crisis, poverty, inequality and unfair trade, as well 
as the failure of  the market in addressing global threats such as to the 
environment.
The formation of  Transparency International in 1993 to annually 
produce a corruption perception index was the first attempt by civil 
society to mobilise a global movement against corruption (Florini and 
Simmons 2000), as contributing to the empowerment of  citizens to have 
a voice in the performance of  their governments. Another example 
occurred in late 1999 during the meeting of  World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in Seattle when civil society mobilised thousands of  people 
to advocate for fairer global trade (Florini and Simmons 2000: 1). 
Civil society also succeeded in mobilising in the late 1990s a petition 
of  24 million signatures through the Jubilee 2000 campaign to create 
awareness about the debt crisis in developing countries (Pettifor and 
Greenhill 2002).
Civil society organisations (CSOs) also ran an effective advocacy 
campaign during the Millennium Summit in 2000 to support the 
recognition of  participatory and people-centred development 
approaches in the adoption of  the Millennium Development Goals 
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(MDGs). They played a leading role through the UN Millennium 
Campaign in 2002 in mobilising global efforts to combat poverty 
and ensure that governments complied with their commitments to 
achieve the MDGs by 2015. Recently, global civil society has also been 
successful in engaging with the international and regional processes that 
have resulted in the adoption of  the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) in 2015, with reduced inequality and improved social justice 
amongst the important new global goals (CIVICUS 2016: 4).
Meanwhile, the academic work of  Stiglitiz (2011), Krugman (2011) 
and others, as well as the evidence-based advocacy work of  civil 
society (Oxfam 2016), have contributed to awakening world attention 
to the threats of  growing inequality. This resulted in the emergence 
in 2011 of  ‘We are the 99 per cent!’ as a populist movement against 
growing inequality. This movement initially gained momentum in 
the USA but expanded to Europe and beyond, and its messages have 
started resonating gradually in the political discourse of  left-wing and 
democratic parties.
The international climate agreement that was reached in Paris in 2015 
was recognition not only of  the failure of  markets in addressing such 
global threats, but also a clear acknowledgement of  civil society as a real 
third force in forging a new politics of  climate change that business and 
government were previously unable to agree on. Jacobs (2016) describes 
the Paris Climate Agreement not only as a huge diplomatic achievement 
but also the product of  the emergence of  a new and strategic quadruple 
alliance of  governments, civil society, the academic community and the 
business community.
4 Emerging economies: the centrality of the state
During the last 50 years, developing countries have experienced different 
paths of  development. In the 1970s, in broad terms development 
thinking shifted from right-wing modernisation theory to the left-wing 
dependency theory of  state-led development that was easily entertained 
by the post-independent ruling elites (Edigheji 2007). However, state-
led development frequently did not produce good economic outcomes 
as post-colonial states were largely weak and dependent on institutions 
that were often alien to indigenous contexts (Menocal 2004: 768). Some 
attributed poor economic performance in post-independent Africa to the 
failure of  liberators because of  the ‘curse of  liberation’ (Clapham 2012), 
leading some to argue that Africa needs a second liberation from the 
liberators themselves (Herbst and Mills 2012).
As the state-led development approach lost intellectual and political 
legitimacy (Hirschman 1981: 7) and with a rising coalition of  reform-
minded academics, policymakers and political elites (Leftwich 2000), the 
market-led development approach re-emerged and came to dominate 
the development agenda from the 1980s in developing countries. Yet, 
neoliberalism politics in the form of  the ‘Washington Consensus’ and 
a market-led development approach has equally failed to produce 
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good economic outcomes and has produced instead low growth, high 
unemployment and inequalities (Edigheji 2007).
With the disappointing performance of  market-led development 
approaches in developing countries, the role of  the state in development 
was revisited and reconsidered in the 1990s. In particular, the World 
Bank softened its position towards the role of  the state in development 
and recognised more fully the centrality of  states in economic and social 
development – not as a direct provider of  growth but as a catalyst and 
facilitator (Leftwich 2000: 51). In the case of  Africa, it is argued that 
the real challenge to development is less about the inability of  states 
to implement neoliberal economic policies but more about building 
autonomous bureaucracy and institutions that have capacity to act on 
behalf  of  society (Menocal 2004: 775). Some studies have shown that 
the weak capacity of  the state may explain poor economic performance 
in many developing countries, but that this weak capacity may not 
justify markets as an alternative, as markets are so reliant upon the state 
to create a conducive and enabling environment (Luiz 2000: 12).
The revival of  the role of  the state in development has been well 
informed by the experience of  some emerging economies in developing 
countries that have shown impressive economic performance. On the 
basis of  the comparative analysis of  state-capacity theory, Edigheji 
(2007: 225) shows in the case of  emerging economies a strong link 
between better economic performance and a high degree of  autonomous 
state institutions with established inclusive connections and synergistic 
relations with social actors. In other words, Edigheji (2007) has shown 
the centrality of  synergistic autonomous state institutions in achieving 
egalitarianism, equality and economic growth in developing countries.
In addition to the experience of  the emerging economies, China provides 
another good example of  impressive economic performance in terms of  
high economic growth and progress in fighting poverty since its adoption 
of  economic reforms in 1978. This swift economic development is partly 
attributed to China’s prioritisation of  modernisation of  state governance, 
and establishment and restructuring of  synergistic relations that were 
carefully sequenced; first restructuring relations between state and 
market, then state and society and finally market and society (Keping 
2014). Yet despite their robust growth and considerable progress in the 
fight against poverty, there are growing concerns about the increasing 
level of  income inequality in the emerging economies, including China, 
that is significantly higher than the OECD average (OECD 2011b).
5 Conclusion: future strategic and hybrid alliances
The neoliberal economic policies that have been driving the global 
economy during the last 50 years have created increasing inequality, 
global social capital deficiency and global political unrest that may 
threaten the very survival of  humanity. With increasing inequality, 
capitalism has come under serious attack and some fear that its fate may 
be heading in the same direction as communism. Media commentary 
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illustrates this. Out of  dismay at the bank bailout, for instance, journalist 
Richard Gwyn (2009) argues that although capitalism may not head for 
the dustbin of  history like communism has, it needs to be subjected to 
radical changes so as to have an efficient and ethical economic system, 
of  the sort that Adam Smith dreamed of. With the disappointing 
performance of  capitalism and dwindling trust in governing elites, 
Wolf  (2016) paints a rather bleak picture of  either a rise of  a global 
plutocracy, illiberal democracies or outright plebiscitary dictatorships if  
liberal democracy and capitalism are not nurtured to serve the interests 
of  the many instead of  the few.
There is a growing sentiment amongst youth and the middle class against 
capitalism and neoliberalism in developed and democratic countries. 
At the time of  writing, the 2016 US general election campaign shows 
that youth and the middle class have become increasingly receptive to 
a socialist agenda (Sheehan 2016). The US Democratic presidential 
candidate, Bernie Sanders, was the most-liked presidential candidate with 
about 61 per cent of  registered voters ready to vote for him (Prupis 2016). 
This surge of  popularity shows dissatisfaction with the establishment as 
well as the appeal of  left-wing election campaign messages. Messages 
around democratic socialism as the basis for creating government that 
works for the middle class and not just for a handful of  billionaires at the 
top, as well as around regulating Wall Street, all resonate with the feelings 
of  many young and middle-class people. Although Bernie Sanders did 
not make it to the White House, his popular election campaign messages 
will shape and continue to shape the political discourse in the US and 
may mark the beginning of  the rise of  democratic socialism and modern 
liberal economic policies in the USA and beyond.
Despite this rising left-wing agenda, Donald Trump, the US Republican 
presidential candidate, emerged in 2016 with growing popularity despite 
his controversial statements about women, immigrants, refugees and 
other minorities (Cherkaoui 2016). Interestingly, supporters of  Donald 
Trump come from a wide political spectrum including liberal, moderate 
and conservative groups as well as the Tea Party Movements (Brady and 
Rivers 2015). His growing popularity may be attributed to his success 
in moving immigration to the centre of  political discourse by projecting 
it as a real threat to the future of  the USA. As opinion polls leading up 
to Election Day in 2016 showed a narrowing gap between him and his 
contestant, the emergence of  the Donald Trump phenomenon can be 
seen as marking the beginning of  an emergent right-wing populism, 
centred on immigration very much as it happened during the Roaring 
Twenties.
A similar trend of  public acceptance of  a left-wing agenda has been 
observed in other European countries, particularly in the UK. The 
election of  Jeremy Corbyn in 2015 as the new leader of  the UK Labour 
Party, with a landslide victory amongst party members, marks not only 
that the party is being led by the most left-wing leader of  the UK’s 
recent history, but an embracing of  a radical shift towards left-wing 
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agendas by some sections of  the public. Certain ‘left-wing’ policies 
of  Jeremy Corbyn such as renationalisation of  the railways, imposing 
more taxes on the rich, rent controls on landlords, a mandatory living 
wage and cuts in university tuition fees were popular and backed by the 
public (Dathan and Stone 2015).
Despite this increased support for more left-wing policies in the 
UK, there is also growing support for right-wing populist policies, 
as illustrated in the 2016 referendum about the status of  the UK in 
Europe. Although all political parties supported the choice to remain in 
Europe, the extreme right wing supported the agenda to leave Europe 
and mobilised popular support largely around the fear of  immigration 
(Vina 2016). This decision and subsequent changes in government have 
strengthened the hegemony and popularity of  right-wing agendas and 
weakened the support to the left-wing agenda.
The surge of  the hegemony and popularity of  right-wing politics 
is visible not only in the UK and the USA, but also in many other 
countries in Europe and even in some in Asia. As in the USA, the far 
right have succeeded not only in presenting immigration as a threat to 
the future of  Europe as the populist right wing did in the mid-1980s, but 
have managed to move the issue of  immigration to the centre of  political 
discourse through the appeal of  populist messages (Yilmaz 2012). If  this 
toxic and acrimonious debate about immigration continues, right-wing 
political parties may come to dominate most governments in advanced 
economies in a way similar to the period of  the Roaring Twenties.
Alongside this rising left-wing movement and the increasing hegemony 
of  right-wing agendas under the umbrella of  immigration, civil society 
movements are emerging as a formidable third force in championing a 
global agenda that is in defiance of  neoliberal economic policies. With 
the information revolution, civil society may come to play an even more 
influential role in driving the global agenda. As rightly mentioned by 
Florini and Simmons (2000: 4), the world badly needs someone to act as 
the ‘global conscience’ to articulate the interests of  large publics that are 
hardly addressed by governments or markets. Equally important, the 
academic community has become a key player and a ‘global mind’ in 
informing debate about global challenges, as well as providing options 
for overcoming these challenges.
It is likely that this emerging ‘global conscience’ movement that is 
increasingly being informed by evidence from ‘global minds’ may forge 
a new alliance with the rising left-wing movement in developed countries 
to drive the future global agenda towards fairer global governance, 
checking greed and achieving equitable growth. The failure of  
‘self-regulated’ markets, the rising left-wing agenda, the emergence of  the 
global conscience and mind and the centrality of  the state in emerging 
economies could all have important implications for restructuring new 
relations between state, market and society that will lead to a fairer global 
governance that serves the interests of  the many and not the few.
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